'Danger Theory: The Link between AIS and IDS?' by Aickelin, Uwe et al.
Danger Theory: The Link between AIS and IDS? 
Proceedings ICARIS-2003, 2nd International Conference on Artificial Immune Systems,  pp 147-155, 2003. 
U Aickelin, P Bentley, S Cayzer, J Kim, J McLeod 
University of Nottingham, uxa@cs.nott.ac.uk 
University College London, P.Bentley@cs.ucl.ac.uk 
HP Labs Bristol, Steve_Cayzer@hplb.hpl.hp.com 
King’s College London, Jungwon@dcs.kcl.ac.uk 
University of the West of England, Julie.Mcleod@uwe.ac.uk 
Abstract We present ideas about creating a next generation Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) based on the latest immunological theories. The central challenge with 
computer security is determining the difference between normal and potentially 
harmful activity. For half a century, developers have protected their systems by 
coding rules that identify and block specific events. However, the nature of current 
and future threats in conjunction with ever larger IT systems urgently requires the 
development of automated and adaptive defensive tools. A promising solution is 
emerging in the form of Artificial Immune Systems (AIS): The Human Immune 
System (HIS) can detect and defend against harmful and previously unseen invaders, 
so can we not build a similar Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for our computers? 
Presumably, those systems would then have the same beneficial properties as HIS like 
error tolerance, adaptation and self-monitoring. Current AIS have been successful on 
test systems, but the algorithms rely on self-nonself discrimination, as stipulated in 
classical immunology. However, immunologist are increasingly finding fault with 
traditional self-nonself thinking and a new ‘Danger Theory’ (DT) is emerging. This 
new theory suggests that the immune system reacts to threats based on the correlation 
of various (danger) signals and it provides a method of ‘grounding’ the immune 
response, i.e. linking it directly to the attacker. Little is currently understood of the 
precise nature and correlation of these signals and the theory is a topic of hot debate. 
It is the aim of this research to investigate this correlation and to translate the DT into 
the realms of computer security, thereby creating AIS that are no longer limited by 
self-nonself discrimination. It should be noted that we do not intend to defend this 
controversial theory per se, although as a deliverable this project will add to the body 
of knowledge in this area. Rather we are interested in its merits for scaling up AIS 
applications by overcoming self-nonself discrimination problems. 
1.   Introduction 
The key to the next generation Intrusion Detection System (IDS) ([9], [25], [26]) that we 
are planning to build is  the combination of recent Artificial Immune System (AIS) / Danger 
Theory (DT) models ([1], [4], [5], [32]) with our growing understanding of cellular 
components involved with cell death ([3], [11], [31]). In particular, the difference between 
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necrotic (‘bad’) and apoptotic (‘good’ or ‘planned’) cell death, with respect to Antigen 
Presenting Cells (APCs) activation, is important in our proposed IDS. In the Human 
Immune System (HIS) apoptosis has a suppressive effect and necrosis a stimulatory 
immunological effect, although they might not actually be as distinct as currently thought. 
 
In the IDS context, we propose to use the correlation of these two effects as a basis 
of ‘danger signals’. A variety of contextual clues may be essential for a meaningful danger 
signal, and immunological studies will provide a framework of ideas as to how ‘danger’ is 
assessed in the HIS. In the IDS context, the danger signals should show up after limited 
attack to minimise damage and therefore have to be quickly and automatically measurable. 
Once the danger signal has been transmitted, the AIS should react to those artificial 
antigens that are ‘near’ the emitter of the danger signal. This allows the AIS to pay special 
attention to dangerous components and would have the advantage of detecting rapidly 
spreading viruses or scanning intrusions fast and at an early stage preventing serious 
damage. 
2.   AIS and Intrusion Detection 
Alongside intrusion prevention techniques such as encryption and firewalls, IDS are 
another significant method used to safeguard computer systems. The main goal of IDS is to 
detect unauthorised use, misuse and abuse of computer systems by both system insiders and 
external intruders. Most current IDS define suspicious signatures based on known 
intrusions and probes [25]. The obvious limit of this type of IDS is its failure of detecting 
previously unknown intrusions. In contrast, the HIS adaptively generates new immune cells 
so that it is able to detect previously unknown and rapidly evolving harmful antigens [28]. 
 
In order to provide viable IDS, AIS must build a set of detectors that accurately 
match antigens. In current AIS based IDS ([9], [12], [19], [13]), both network connections 
and detectors are modelled as strings. Detectors are randomly created and then undergo a 
maturation phase where they are presented with good, i.e. self, connections. If the detectors 
match any of these they are eliminated otherwise they become mature. These mature 
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detectors start to monitor new connections during their lifetime. If these mature detectors 
match anything else, exceeding a certain threshold value, they become activated. This is 
then reported to a human operator who decides whether there is a true anomaly. If so, the 
detectors are promoted to memory detectors with an indefinite life span and minimum 
activation threshold (immunisation) [27]. 
 
An approach such as the above is known as negative selection as only those 
detectors (antibodies) that do not match live on [13]. However, this appealing approach 
shows scaling problems when it is applied to real network traffic [26]. As the systems to be 
protected grow larger and larger so does self and nonself. Hence, it becomes more and more 
problematic to find a set of detectors that provides adequate coverage, whilst being 
computationally efficient. It is inefficient, to map the entire self or nonself universe, 
particularly as they will be changing over time and only a minority of nonself is harmful, 
whilst some self might cause damage (e.g. internal attack). This situation is further 
aggravated by the fact that the labels self and nonself are often ambiguous and even with 
expert knowledge they are not always applied correctly [24]. 
2.1  The Danger Theory 
We now examine the biological basis for the self-nonself metaphor, and the alternative DT 
hypothesis. The HIS is commonly thought to work at two levels: innate immunity including 
external barriers (skin, mucus), and the acquired or adaptive immune system [28]. As part 
of the latter level, B-Lymphocytes secrete specific antibodies that recognise and react to 
stimuli. It is this matching between antibodies and antigens that lies at the heart of the HIS 
and most AIS implementations. 
 
The central tenet of the immune system is the ability to respond to foreign invaders 
or ‘antigens’ whilst not reacting to ‘self’ molecules. In order to undertake this role the 
immune system needs to be able to discern differences between foreign, and possibly 
pathogenic, invaders and non-foreign molecules. It is currently believed that this occurs 
through the utilisation of the Major Histocompatability Complex (MHC). This complex is 
unique to each individual and therefore provides a marker of ‘self’. In addition, the cells 
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within the immune system are matured by becoming tolerised to self-molecules. Together, 
through the MHC and tolerance, the HIS is able to recognise foreign invaders and send the 
requisite signals to the key effector cells involved with the immune response. 
 
The DT debates this and argues that there must be discrimination happening that 
goes beyond the self-nonself distinction because the HIS only discriminates ‘some self’ 
from ‘some nonself’. It could therefore be proposed that it is not the ‘foreignness’ of the 
invaders that is important for immune recognition, but the relative ‘danger’ of these 
invaders. This theory was first proposed in 1994 [29] to explain current anomalies in our 
understanding of how the immune system recognises foreign invaders. For instance, there is 
no immune reaction to foreign bacteria in the gut or to food. Conversely, some auto-
reactive processes exist, e.g. against self-molecules expressed by stressed cells. 
Furthermore, the human body (self) changes over its lifetime. Therefore, why do defences 
against nonself learned early in life not become auto-reactive later? 
 
The DT suggests that foreign invaders, which are dangerous, will induce the 
generation of cellular molecules (danger signals) by initiating cellular stress or cell death 
[30]. These molecules are recognised by APCs, critical cells in the initiation of an immune 
response, which become activated leading to protective immune interactions. Overall there 
are two classes of danger signal; those which are generated endogenously i.e. by the body 
itself, and exogenous signals which are derived from invading organisms e.g. bacteria [16]. 
Evidence is accruing as to the existence of myriad endogenous danger signals including cell 
receptors, intracellular molecules and cytokines. A commonality is their ability to activate 
APCs and thus drive an immune response. 
 
We believe that the DT will provide a more suitable biological metaphor for IDS 
than the traditional self-nonself viewpoint, regardless whether the theory holds for the HIS, 
something that is currently hotly debated amongst immunologists ([37], [21], [39]). In 
particular, the DT provides a way of grounding the response, i.e. linking it directly to the 
attacker and it removes the necessity to map self or nonself [1]. In our model, self-nonself 
discrimination will still be useful but it is no longer essential. This is because nonself no 
longer causes a response. Instead, danger signals will trigger a reaction. Actually, the 
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response is more complicated than this, since it is believed that the APCs integrate necrotic 
(‘danger’) and apoptotic (‘safe’) signals in order to regulate the immune response. We 
intend to examine this integrative activity experimentally, which should provide useful 
inspiration for IDS. 
2.2  The DT in the Context of the HIS 
One of the central themes of the DT is the generation of danger signals through cellular 
stress or cell death. Cell death can occur in two ways; necrosis and apoptosis, and although 
both terminate in cell death, the intracellular pathways of each process are very distinct. 
Necrosis involves the unregulated death of a cell following cell stress and results in total 
cell lysis and subsequent inflammation due to the cell debris. Apoptosis, on the other hand, 
is a very regulated form of cell death with defined intracellular pathways and regulators 
[23]. Physiologically, apoptosis is utilised by the body to maintain tissue homeostasis and is 
vital in regulating the immune response. Once apoptosis is initiated extracellular receptors 
on the cell signal to phagocytic cells, e.g. APCs to remove the dying cell from the system. 
 
Apoptosis can be initiated in a number of ways including; cytokine deprivation, 
death receptors e.g. CD95 and UV irradiation each having unique intracellular signalling 
profiles [17]. Interestingly, recent work has suggested that apoptotic pathways may not be 
as distinct from necrosis as previously assumed [20] and indeed may be inter-related. In 
both cases phagocytosis of the dying cell occurs and studies suggests that the APCs receive 
signals from the dying cells that affects activation state of the APCs themselves [35]. These 
results are of particular interest since they support the concept of danger signals, with the 
APCs being a rheostat responding to ‘input’ signals from cells undergoing necrosis, tipping 
the immune balance towards a pro-inflammatory state, which is an ‘output’ signal. 
 
Evidence to support the critical role of cell death signals in APC activation has 
shown that APCs, which have phagocytosed necrotic cells, generate pro-inflammatory 
cytokines e.g. interleukin (IL) –1, interferon (IFN) and necrotic cells have been found to 
activate APCs in a vital step towards an immune response ([35], [15]). Of particular interest 
is the finding that cells undergoing apoptosis, rather than being invisible to the APCs, may 
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actually help regulate the APCs response to necrotic cell debris. Studies [14] have shown 
that apoptotic cells actively down-regulate the APC activity by generating anti-
inflammatory cytokines e.g. TGF and PGE2, although in other cases this has not been 
observed [35]. 
 
In a further complexity to the balance, reports have shown that necrotic and 
apoptotic cells work together to affect the APC activation and subsequent immune response 
[35]. Therefore a balance between cell death, either necrotic or apoptotic, would appear to 
be critical to the final immunological outcome . Here, we seek to understand how the APCs 
react to the balance of ‘input’ signals from apoptotic and necrotic cell death with an aim to 
determine and simplify the danger signal ‘output’. 
 
Previous studies have observed alterations in the generation of pro- and anti-
inflammatory cytokines e.g. IL-1, IFN, TGF -ß and PGE2 following APC incubation with 
necrotic or apoptotic cells respectively [14]. In addition, activation-related receptors e.g. 
MHC and CD80/86 have been reported to be upregulated in the presence of necrotic cells  
[15]. We intend to extend and confirm these studies using proteomics, which will allow the 
pan-identification of novel, key proteins within the APC which are influenced by the 
presence of dying cells or ‘danger signals’. 
 
Hence, the aims of the immunological investigation can be summarised as  
· To identify and investigate key APC-derived signals in response to co-culture with 
necrotic or apoptotic cells. 
· To undertake functional analysis of the identified key signals in affecting the 
activation state of immune cells. 
· To manipulate the co-culture system and derived signals upon results from the AIS / 
IDS studies. 
2.3   Intrusion Detection Systems – Current State of the Art 
An important and recent research issue for IDS is how to find true intrusion alerts from 
thousands alerts generated [19]. Existing IDS employ various types of sensors that monitor 
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low-level system events. Those sensors report anomalies of network traffic patterns, 
unusual terminations of UNIX processes, memory usages, the attempts to access 
unauthorised files, etc. [24]. Although these reports are useful signals of real intrusions, 
they are often mixed with false alerts and their unmanageable volume forces a security 
officer to ignore most alerts [18]. Moreover, the low level of alerts makes it  hard for a 
security officer to identify advancing intrusions that usually consist of different stages of 
attack sequences. For instance, hackers often use a number of preparatory stages (raising 
low-level alerts) before actual hacking [18]. Hence, the correlations between intrusion alerts 
from different attack stages provide more convincing attack scenarios than detecting an 
intrusion scenario based on low-level alerts from individual stages . 
 
To correlate IDS alerts for detection of an intrusion scenario, recent studies have 
employed two different approaches: a probabilistic approach ([8], [36], [38]) and an expert 
system approach ([6], [7], [10], [33], [34]). The probabilistic approach represents known 
intrusion scenarios as Bayesian networks. The nodes of Bayesian networks are IDS alerts 
and the posterior likelihood between nodes is updated as new alerts are collected. The 
updated likelihood can lead to conclusions about a specific intrusion scenario occurring or 
not. The expert system approach initially builds possible intrusion scenarios by identifying 
low-level alerts. These alerts consist of prerequisites and consequences, and they are 
represented as hypergraphs ([33], [34]) or specification language forms ([6], [10], [18]). 
Known intrusion scenarios are detected by observing the low-level alerts at each stage. 
These approaches have the following problems [7]: 
· Handling unobserved low-level alerts that comprise an intrusion scenario. 
· Handling optional prerequisite actions and intrusion scenario variations. 
 
The common trait of these problems is that the IDS can fail to detect an intrusion if an 
incomplete set of alerts comprising an intrusion scenario is reported. In handling this 
problem, the probabilistic approach is somewhat more advantageous because in theory it 
allows the IDS to correlate missing or mutated alerts. However, the similarities alone can 
fail to identify a causal relationship between prerequisite actions and actual attacks if pairs 
of prerequisite actions and actual attacks do not appear frequently enough to be reported. 
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Attackers often do not repeat the same actions in order to disguise their attempts. Thus, the 
current probabilistic approach fails to detect intrusions that do not show strong similarities 
between alert features but have causal relationships leading to final attacks ([8], [36], [38]). 
3.   A DT-Inspired Approach to Intrusion Detection 
We propose AIS based on DT ideas that can handle the above IDS alert correlation 
problems. As outline previously, the DT explains the immune response of the human body 
by the interaction between APCs and various signals. The immune response of each APC is 
determined by the generation of danger signals through cellular stress or death. In 
particular, the balance and correlation between different signals depending on different 
causes appears to be critical to the immunological outcome. Proposed wet experiments of 
this project focus on understanding how the APCs react to the balance of different types of 
signals, and how this reaction leads to an overall immune response. Similarly, our IDS 
investigation will centre on understanding how intrusion scenarios would be detected by 
reacting to the balance of various types of alerts. In the HIS, APCs activate according to the 
balance of apoptotic and necrotic cells and this activation leads to protective immune 
responses. Similarly, the sensors in IDS report various low-level alerts and the correlation 
of these alerts will lead to the construction of an intrusion scenario. 
3.1   Apoptotic versus Necrotic Alerts 
We believe that various IDS alerts can be categorised into two groups: apoptotic type of 
alerts and necrotic type of alerts. Apoptotic alerts correspond to ‘normal’ cell death – 
hence, low-level alerts that could result from legitimate actions but could also be the 
prerequisites for an attack. Necrotic (unregulated cell death) alerts on the other hand relate 
to actual damage caused by a successful attack. An intrusion scenario consists of several 
actions, divided into prerequisite stages and actual attack stages [7]. For instance, in the 
case of Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) intrusions, intruders initially look for 
vulnerable Sadmind services by executing the Ping Sadmind process [33]. This would be an 
apoptotic alert, relating to a prerequisite action. Just as apoptosis is vital in regulating the 
human immune response, apoptotic types of alerts are vital in detecting an intrusion 
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scenario (since it indicates the prerequisite actions within an actual intrusion scenario) 
Necrotic alerts, or actual attack alerts are raised when the IDS observes system damage 
caused by the DDOS. Just as necrosis involves the unregulated cell death, necrotic types of 
alerts would be those generated from the unexpected system outcomes. 
 
In our opinion, a better understanding how the APCs react to the balance of 
apoptotic and necrotic cells would help us to propose a new approach to correlate apoptotic 
and necrotic type of alerts generated from sensors. If the DT can explain the key proteins 
leading to necrotic and apoptotic signals, DT-based AIS would also be able to identify key 
types of apoptotic and necrotic alerts revealing the degree of alert correlation. In this way, 
DT-based AIS will correlate key types of alerts rather than specific alerts, and this will 
allow the AIS to correlate missing or mutated alerts as long as the key types of alerts are 
reported. For instance, in the DDOS example, an intruder can directly attack without 
executing Ping but executing the similar process traceroute instead [7]. In this case, our 
DT-based AIS should be able to link traceroute to DDOS attack damage since any type of 
scanning process is understood as an apoptotic type of alert for DDOS attacks. 
3.2 Strength of Reactions 
Additionally, if the DT can quantify the degree of the immune response, DT-based AIS 
would be able to quantify the degree of overall alert detection strictness. For instance, false 
positive alerts of IDS are often caused by inappropriately setting of intrusion signatures or 
anomaly thresholds. Debar and Wespi [9] use a clustering algorithm to group a large 
number of alerts and manually extract a generalised alarm reflecting each alarm cluster. By 
doing so, they identify the root cause of each alarm cluster and discriminate false positive 
alert clusters from true positive alert clusters. The root cause is the most basic cause that 
can reasonably be identified and fixed [9]. According to the identified root causes, new 
intrusion signatures or anomaly thresholds are redefined by remo ving those causing root 
causes. 
 
However, their work has not reported further impacts after intrusion signatures and 
anomaly thresholds are reset. Simple removal of intrusion signatures that cause the root 
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causes might degrade true positive detection rate instead. Furthermore, continuous changes 
of network and system environments require constant updates of intrusion signatures and 
anomaly thresholds. Thus, it is important for IDS how to react to false positive alerts and 
true positive alerts dynamically. The key feature of the DT-based AIS would provide a 
possible solution for this issue. The DT-based AIS would adopt a similar way to two types 
of immune cell death signals affecting the activation of nearby APCs. Currently observed 
balances between two types of alerts would affect the IDS sensors’ activation status by 
resetting intrusion signatures or anomaly thresholds. Then, these new settings will result in 
new balances between the two types of alerts. If the DT can explain that this kind of 
cascading reaction stabilises in a way so that the overall immune responses can converge to 
an ideal status at given time, the DT-based AIS would also be able to follow a similar 
mechanism to identify the most suitable intrusion signature and anomaly thresholds setting 
at given time. 
3.3   Danger Zones 
Furthermore, our study aims to investigate how the danger alerts reported from a sensor can 
be transmitted to other sensors in order to detect on-going intrusions. Once a sensor has 
generated the danger signals or alerts, the AIS can quantify the degree of alert correlations 
indicating the strength of possible intrusion scenarios. If the AIS has strong indications of 
possible intrusion scenarios, it can activate other sensors that are spatially, temporally or 
logically ‘near’ the original sensor emitting the danger signal. This process is similar to the 
activated APCs sending its immune response providing a self-nonself independent 
grounding. For instance, when the danger signal reports the strong possibility of a web 
server compromise, this signal can be sent to other web servers in the same network 
domain. 
4.   Summary and Conclusions  
Our aim is to challenge the classical self-nonself viewpoint in AIS based IDS, and replace it 
by ideas from the DT. Existing systems using certain aspects of the HIS have been 
successful on small problems and have shown the same benefits as their natural 
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counterparts: error tolerance, adaptation and self-monitoring. The DT is a new theory 
amongst immunologists stating that the natural immune system does not rely on self-
nonself discrimination but identifies ‘danger’. This is currently hotly debated by 
immunologists and far from widely accepted and has never before been applied to the IDS 
arena. It is our opinion that this theory is the key that will unlock the true potential of AIS 
by allowing us to build commercially viable systems that can scale up to real world 
problem sizes. 
 
We intend to use the correlation of signals based on the DT. We believe the 
success of our system to be independent of the eventual acceptance or rejection of the DT 
by immunologist as the proposed AIS would achieve this by identifying key types of 
apoptotic and necrotic alerts and understanding the balance between these two types of 
alerts. In addition, the proposed AIS is extended by employing the APC activation 
mechanism explained by the DT. This mechanism has the advantage of detecting rapidly 
spreading viruses or scanning intrusions at an early stage. 
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